minimum alliances that are necessary to overcome these problems. Climate change is the most obvious case in point; unless all the major players and their citizens willingly and proactively cooperate, it is unlikely that human civilization as we know it will survive. It is clear that Commodore Matthew Perry's body language will not secure the proactive and willing cooperation of citizens around the world. Hubris and cynicism will also not embolden those who witness emerging threats and plots, as diverse as those by Osama bin Laden or Abdul Qadeer Khan, to speak out.
And thus both notions and perceptions of fairness will be central to developing the master narrative about our epic interdependence and our responsibilities toward each other. Without a sense of fairness that appeals to many and a corresponding framework of global civics, we cannot navigate the treacherous waters of global interdependence. 3 The world's architecture of power is not the only vector that is becoming more democratic. Through the rapid proliferation of transborder broadcasting, we have become increasingly aware of each other's grief and bliss. We are not yet a global village, but we are signifi cantly more aware of each other's predicaments than a decade or a century ago, and as a result, public opinion has come to matter even in the previously manderin realm of foreign policy. Yet it also so happens that public opinion around the world is more multilateralist than the views of policymakers. For instance, a recent survey by the organization World Public Opinion shows that when given the option between "Our nation should consistently follow international law; it is wrong to violate international law, just as it is wrong to violate laws within a country" and "If our government thinks it is not in our nation's inter- A total of 48 percent said that they personally were more supportive of consistently abiding by international law than the average citizen; 28 percent said they were less supportive. This optical illusion can possibly be explained by the hegemonic discourse of the cynics, and may itself present an opportunity for enhanced multilateralism. It is not diffi cult to observe the disdain that cynical policymakers have for popular preferences for international norms, in the complaint that "Americans do not want their power raw; it has to be sautéed in the best of causes." 5 A similar survey has shown that 55 percent of the people in 24 countries wanted their governments to be more ready to act cooperatively to achieve mutual gain, as opposed to the 39 percent who felt that their governments tend to be too willing to compromise and are often taken advantage of.
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The working paper is not a blanket indictment of cynicism. Idealists have been called cynics who have not yet been mugged by reality, and there is a signifi cant degree of truth in this assertion. Yet one can also argue that cynics are moderate idealists who yearn to be rescued from their excessive pessimism. The task of balancing the feasible and the ideal has never been easy, and it has certainly defi ed timeless prescriptive formulas. The conjecture of the contributors to this paper is simply that fairness matters more than cynics would have us believe, and it will matter more in the future as power disparities further decrease, and larger alliances that are more based on society become necessary.
This paper includes essays by authors analyzing the situations in nine countries: Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Africa and Spain. Each analyst was asked to answer whether the policy elites and public opinion in their country view the international order as essentially predatory (sometimes referred as Hobbesian) or essentially fair and rule based (sometimes referred as Kantian). Each analyst was also asked to address the events in the particular country that were central in informing these assessments, and whether the policy elites and public opinion would be more supportive of enhanced national contributions to overcoming global problems, if they were convinced that a fairer international order was possible.
There are both convergences and divergences among the nine analyses. We see that countries that have benefi ted in the past from international solidarity and normative action, such as South Africa and Spainconsidered here, respectively, by Siphamandla Zondi and Jordi Vaquer-have then become responsible international actors. We also see that there are cases of, as in Egypt, profound disappointment with the current international system. In the essay on Indonesia, Hadi Soesastro and Evan Laksmana remind us of the centrality of national politics as the link between national public opinion and global problems. In considering the situation in Japan, Motofumi Asai points toward the centrality of political culture. Rakesh Batabyal, in examining the situation in India, depicts how the ethos of decolonization had shaped his nation's proclivities on the world stage. We are told that global norm entrepreneurship is viewed as a soft power tactic to advance national interests in Brazil and Indonesia.
With respect to Italy, Ettore Greco and Nathalie Tocci convincingly argue that concerns about the nation's relative decline in prominence in the international system need not be an obstacle to being a good global citizen.
Most of the analysts agree that public opinion in their countries is more multilateralist than the opinions of the policy elites. They also concur that perceptions of a fairer international order would boost the appetite for national contributions to global problems. Daniel
Fung's depiction of China is the exception. He argues that Chinese public opinion is markedly more nationalistic than the opinions of the nation's elites, and that
China is a risk-averse member of the international community, more interested in stability and order than adventurous redesigns. In the case of China as well as the other countries, the art of aspirational aggregation seems critical. Will we be able to acknowledge with genuine sincerity the legitimate disappointments of many with the international system and yet still harness their readiness to take a realistic leap of faith for a better world where they share in the responsibility? This remains a key question for our time.
In his thoughtful Afterword to this volume, Brian
Urquhart observes that global fairness and civility are vast and simultaneously glorious objectives. While they may never be altogether realized, they are an indispensible guide to decent behavior. Urquhart notes that because a universal tradition of fairness and public spirit will not be created quickly or easily, the foundation from which it can grow needs to be established as soon as possible. It is diffi cult to disagree with him.
In the true spirit of a working paper, we plan to discuss the pertinent issues raised here both online and offl ine for six months, and then we will publish a second and fi nal version of this volume in October 2010. The result of this historical path is the combination of a nationalist perspective on the world with a vision of the international arena as a fearful one, where the country should fi ght for its interests while seeking to be part of the everyday building of the international system. This mixture has produced a notion that blends the perception of an unfair international environment, constructed on unequal terms, with the The billion-dollar question, which is more difficult to answer, is still whether Chinese public opinion or that of the policy elites would more readily support an increase in national spending to build a fairer international order-at least, one that is fairer to China from its perspective. Although Chinese public opinion would certainly welcome the nation attaining a higher and more favorable international profi le, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that public opinion would necessarily support greater overseas spending just for the sake of building a fairer international public profi le.
On the contrary, given that China's economy is, like that of the U.S., predominantly continental, and China is, even more than the U.S., a universe unto itself, and
given also that China exists at a much lower stage of development, a broad swathe of Chinese public opin-ion would likely prefer to see such expenditures take place domestically. The adage that "charity begins at home" could well become a Chinese domestic political slogan in the fi rst half of this century.
As for China's policy elites, however, there is little question that they would be prepared to countenance a higher and more favorable profi le for the country on 
The Israeli Exception
The India's colonial experience and strong opposition to a hierarchical social order have made both its leaders and the public sensitive to the issue of equality. Discrimination on the basis of race, religion or nationality has been strongly resented ever since Independence. 7 Thus Indian leaders had wide support from the people when they decided to raise the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa, and in fact did not agree to have even diplomatic relations with that nation until it ended its policy of apartheid. And this desire for a democratic world order has also been in tune with the expansion of democracy inside India. In this sense, the Indian contribution to world events will continue to deepen and expand in the future as this internal expansion of democracy continues.
Since the early decades of the twentieth century, Specifi cally, the world is seen to be an unfair arena of competition among states that has often provided both opportunities and threats to Indonesia-and thus the country needs to be not only independent but also actively seek to shape international events.
However, given Indonesia's continued domestic problems, and its lack of military and economic power, such views can only be implemented using the nation's As for questions of war and peace, Italians manifest a strong belief in soft power as a recipe for dealing with global confl icts, with 81 percent of respondents considering economic instruments more effective than military ones, while decisively shunning the claim that war may be necessary to achieve justice (80 percent). Maruyama Masao, an outstanding political thinker and scholar of the history of Japan's political thought, once characterized the concept of Japanese "reality"
The Yudhoyono Paradox and Foreign Policy
as having three strong political biases: It is submissive to, rather than challenging, the given; it is one-dimensional, and therefore ossifi ed rather than multifaceted and fl exible; and it is subservient to the strong and coercive against the weak. In sum, resignation imbued with cynicism to power politics has thus been a part of the national character. The introduction of pacifi sm and individualistic democracy onto Japan's political soil by the Peace Constitution led, for the fi rst time in its history, to the emergence of civil public opinion. Now, however, after more than 60 years' experience with constitutional democracy, Japanese public opinion has still not yet established itself as an independent political force against the poweroriented, conservative political establishment. With this historical background in mind, I would argue that Japan's conservative policy elites stubbornly believe that the international order is unchangeably predatory, whereas its public opinion is still in a state of fl ux between Hobbesian and Kantian views.
Japan's conservative political elites have consistently maintained that its Peace Constitution is a foreign document that must be revised so that Japan can become a "normal," rearmed country and thus adapt itself to the power-driven international system, and they have also maintained that the Constitution's "ex- Japan's policy elites stubbornly believe that the international order is unchangeably predatory, whereas its public opinion is in a state of fl ux between Hobbesian and Kantian views. 
Conclusion
The challenge for South Africa is that crude power politics and tension in the international system are more prevalent than is generally assumed. This situation, then, is bound to push the country into one or the other camp in the global power struggles, which will weaken its capacity to act as a global norm en- Anyone who has worked for many years in an admittedly flawed international system becomes accustomed to being called deluded, naïve or unrealistic. In A universal tradition of fairness and public spirit will not be created quickly or easily; This is why the foundation from which it can grow needs to be established as soon as possible.
the end, however, it is possible to look back on a surprising degree of progress that was diffi cult to discern at the time, sometimes toward objectives that were previously thought to be hopelessly unattainable.
Fairness and civility are vast objectives even for a single state, but if we pride ourselves on having achieved globalization and a revolution in human communication, why should fairness and civility not also be global objectives? Such vast objectives may never be altogether realized. They stand as a guide to behavior, a great work in continual progress in which leaders, teachers, NGO's, the media, artists and intellectuals can play their part. Human nature can develop and change, and not always in the wrong direction.
In his introductory essay, Hakan Altinay asks: "Will we be able to acknowledge with genuine sincerity the legitimate disappointments of many with the international systems and yet still harness their readiness to take a realistic leap of faith for a better world where they share in the responsibility?" I would answer that unless and until the peoples of the world, whom the UN Charter names in its opening words, associate themselves actively with the higher aspirations of the international system, the best hopes of our human civilization will remain to some extent unfulfi lled. 
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